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ABSTRACT. We advance a model of human probability judgment and apply it to the
design of an extrapolation algorithm. Such an algorithm examines a person's judgment
about the likelihood of various statements and is then able to predict the same person's
judgments about new statements. The algorithm is tested against judgments produced by
thirty undergraduates asked to assign probabilities to statements about mammals.
Keywords: Probability, judgment, psychology.

The present paper advances a model of human probability judgment
and applies it to the design of an extrapolation algorithm. Such an
algorithm examines a person's judgment about the likelihood of
various statements and is then able to predict the same person's
judgments about new statements.
Section 1 describes the kind of extrapolation task for which our
model is designed. The model itself is presented in Section 2. Section 3
shows how the model may be used to extrapolate human probability
judgment. Concluding remarks occupy Section 4.

1. E X T R A P O L A T I O N

TASKS

The extrapolation tasks we consider are built around object-names and
predicates. In our experiments, the former refer to mammals, like
'Lions', 'Rabbits', and 'Deer' whereas the latter express biological
properties like 'have three layers of lipid tissue surrounding vital
organs'. A pair (O, P) consisting of object O and predicate P defines a
statement attributing P to O. By an argument is meant a statement s
associated with a (possibly empty) set {Sl"''Sm} of statements such
that sJ~ {s 1 .--sin}: s is the argument's conclusion, and s l . . . s m are its
premises. Arguments may be written in the form (s[ sl---sin) or
vertically as in (1).
Theory and Decision 36: 103-129, 1994.
© 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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TABLE I
Number of m-premise arguments based on five objects and 1
predicate.
m

m-premise arguments

0
1
2
3
4

5
20
30
20
5

total:

80

5"1

Sm
s

(1)

We refer to (1) as an 'm-premise' argument. 0-premise arguments
are just statements. Note that the premises of an argument are an
unordered set. To write an argument, the premises are ordered
arbitrarily.
For simplicity in what follows attention is limited to arguments in
which only a single predicate appears. Negations and other connectives
are also absent. The model can be extended in a natural way to
arguments of greater complexity, but this is not done here. For present
purposes, the general form of an argument is thus:
(ol,p)

(O m, P)
(O, P)
Any choice of sets

(2)
of objects and predicates induces a
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corresponding set of arguments. For example, if O has five members
and ~ has one, then there are five statements and eighty distinct
arguments, as described in Table I.
By an agent A for G and ~ we mean any system that maps the set of
arguments generated by O and N into the interval [0, 1]. Given such an
argument (s I sl.. "Sin), A(S[ $1"" "Sin) may be conceived as the probability that A assigns to s while assuming the truth of s 1 - • "sin, i.e., the
conditional probability for A of s given s l . . . s m . In the case of a
0-premise argument s, A(s) is just the (unconditional) probability that
A attributes to s. Since the agent in question may be human, we do not
assume that A's probabilities conform to the standard probability
calculus (except for being representable by the interval [0, 1]).
Now suppose that a set of objects G, a set of predicates N, and a
class of agents ~d for G and ~ have been specified. The extrapolation
problem for ~, ~ , and s4 is to find an algorithm aig that behaves as
follows. An agent A ~ s~ and a finite set of arguments a l - • • ag based
on 0, ~ are chosen arbitrarily. The pairs (al, A(a~))... (a~, A(ak) ) are
fed to alg (each pair can be interpreted as a message of the form: 'To
such-and-such argument the chosen agent attributes such-and-such
probability'), alg Then performs a calculation over the input and
enters a state that allows it to compute A to some reasonable
approximation in the sense that for all remaining arguments a, A(a) ~alg(a).
Many versions of the extrapolation problem can be distinguished,
depending on the number and diversity of the pairs exhibited to alg, on
the quality of the approximation required, on the likelihood that alg
delivers the desired approximation, and on the time allowed for alg to
finish its calculations. It is not necessary in what follows to establish
terminology for all these cases. We aim simply to present evidence that
the extrapolation problem is solvable - in a general, qualitative sense when objects and predicates are drawn from a familiar domain like
mammals, and when potential agents are limited to college students.
Our extrapolation algorithm rests on a specific model of human
probability judgment. The input data are used to fix the parameters of
this model so as to simulate the psychology of the unknown agent.
Once the parameters have been fixed, the model is used to predict new
judgments.
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We now consider the model in question.
2. THE GAP MODEL OF PROBABILITY JUDGMENT
2.1. Vectorial R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s

As indicated in the last section our model concerns judgments elicited
by arguments like the following.
Lions have three layers of lipid tissue surrounding vital organs.
Rabbits have three layers of lipid tissue surrounding vital organs.
Deer have three layers of lipid tissue surrounding vital organs.

(3)

A central assumption of the model is that people's beliefs about
objects and predicates in natural domains can be represented by real
vectors in an appropriate attribute space. (See [33, 3, 32] for similar
assumptions in other models.) Suppose for illustration that a given
subject distinguishes three attributes of mammals, namely: s i z e ,
f e r o c i t y , and f r i g i d n e s s - o f - h a b i t a t . Then the objects of argument (3)
might be represented in this mind as shown in Table II.
We assume that predicates can be evaluated along the same
dimensions as objects. The predicate of argument (3), for example,
might give rise to the last column in Table II. The value '4' in this
column represents the size required of mammals to have vital organs
surrounded by three layers of lipid tissue, according to the conceptions
of our given subject.
It is not assumed that attributes are independent, either conceptually
or stochastically. In particular, one attribute might represent the
TABLE II
Hypothetical vectors associated with the three objects and one predicate figuring in
argument (3).
attributes
1) size
2) ferocity
3) frigid-habitat

Lions

Rabbits

Deer

3 lipid layers

3
6
-3

1
0
3

3
1
4

4
0
5
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interaction of two others, for example, as the product of their values.
The psychological reality of interactions among attributes has been
noted in [15, 16, 17].
Henceforth we use variables like O and P to denote not only
grammatical entities like objects and predicates, but also the vectors
assumed to be associated with them.

2.2.

Probability of Statements

For a statement (O, P) to be probable, the values in the vector O
should be at least as great as the corresponding values in P. This idea
may be quantified with the 'cut-off' operator -', defined over real
numbers by:
x "-- y = m a x { O , x - y }

(Thus, 5 ' - 3 = 2 and 3"--5 = 0.) Now suppose that the underlying
attribute space has dimension n. Then the probability of (O, P) is
estimated to be:

(4)

1 q- ~in_l (el = Qi)

where Pi and O~ are the values at the ith coordinate of the vectors P
and O. To illustrate, according to (4) and Table II, the probability that
deer have three layers of lipid tissue surrounding vital organs is:

1 + ((4 --" 3) + (0 -" 1) + (5 = 4))

-o.33

(5)

It is easy to see that formula (4) yields a number in [0, 1] whatever
vectors are associated with O, P. Probability 1 is attained if O i i> Pi for
all attributes i ~ n; the surplus of O i over Pi plays no role in the
calculation. Observe as well that an attribute disappears from the
calculation of (4) to the extent that P~ is small; intuitively, such a value
represents a nonstringent condition for possession of the predicate P.
The relative salience, or importance, of an attribute is reflected in the
spread of its values across objects and predicates.
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An attribute like ferocity might be accompanied in a subject's mind
by a contrasting attribute like tameness, and animals with high values
on the former might have low values on the latter (and vice versa).
Such pairs introduce an element of symmetry into the calculation of
probability. Suppose, for example, that a given property P has the
value 3 at both ferocity and tameness. Then according to (4), highly
ferocious animals have little chance of possessing P (since their
tameness value is too low) and likewise for highly tame animals (since
their ferocity value is too low).
Pi "-Oi may be conceived as the 'gap' separating object O from
predicate P with respect to attribute i. Formula (4) exhibits the
probability of (O, P) as a function of these gaps, hence the name 'Gap
Model' for the present theory.

2.3. Conditional Probability: One Premise Case
Probabilities are associated with arguments like (2) in two steps. First
the premises (01, P ) . . . (0 m, P) provoke modifications in the vector
representation of P, yielding a new vector P'. The statement (O, P') is
then taken as the 'revised conclusion' of (2), and its probability is
evaluated via formula (4). This latter probability is attributed to the
argument as a whole. The transition from P to P' represents the
impact of the information that our subject acquires by assuming the
truth of premises (01, P ) . . . (0 m, P). To explain the nature of this
impact according to the Gap Model, we first analyze the 1-premise
argument that results from suppressing the first premise of (3). It may
be abbreviated as follows.

(RABBITS,LAYERS)
(DEER, LAYERS)

(6)

To evaluate (6) our subject must assume the truth of (RABBITS,
LAYERS) and judge the probability of (DEER, LAYERS). For this purpose
the Gap Model posits the following train of reasoning. Table II shows
that LAYERS1 -- RABBn'S1 = 3, signifying that rabbits do not have the size
required
of
mammals
with
property
LAYERS. However,
(RABBITS,LAYERS) is a premise, hence assumed to be true. Therefore,
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the property LAYERS does not require size-value 4 in order for an
animal to have it. We are thus led to lower LAYERS1, but only to the
extent that rabbits resemble deer. Similarity between objects is
assumed to govern the extent to which information obtained from the
premise is brought to bear on the conclusion. Thus, in altering LAYERS
as it applies to DEER, the Gap Model lowers LAYERSI by:
(LAYERS 1 "-- RABBITS I ) X

similarity(RABBITS, DEER)

(7)

For the similarity function in formula (7) we choose a simple measure
of proximity between n-dimensional vectors, v, w, namely:
1

similarity(v, w) = 1 + distance(v, w)

(8)

where d&tance is Euclidean distance in n-space. The range of similarity
is seen to be [0, 1]. To illustrate, according to Table II:

simitarity(1L~BBITS,DEER)
1

= 0.290

1 + ~ / ( 1 - 3) 2 + ( 0 - 1) 2 + (3 - 4) 2

Thus, according to (7) the impact of the gap LAYERS1 ~' RABBITSt on the
vector LAYERS is attenuated by a factor of 0.290, so only 3 x 0.290 is
subtracted from LAYERS1, leaving 4 - (3 x 0.290) = 3.13.
T h e gap for the second attribute, ferocity, is LAYERS2 "~ RABBITS 2 = 0.
The second coordinate of LAYERS is therefore reduced by 0 x
similarity(RABBITS, DEER) and so retains its original value.
Finally, LAYERS3 is reduced by
(LAYERS 3 "-':-RABBITS3) X

similarity(RABBITS, DEER)

= (5 - 3) x 0.290 = 0.580
and becomes

The
vector
values
ability

LAYERS 3 -- 0 . 5 8 0 = 5 -- 0 . 5 8 0 = 4 . 4 2 .

premise (RABmTS, LAYERS) of argument (6) has thus modified the
LAYERS from its original state shown in Table II to the new
LAYERS' = (3.13, 0, 4.42). It remains only to calculate the probof (DEER, LAYERS') according to formula (4). This yields:
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1
1 + (3.13 - 3) + (0--" 1) + (4.42-" 4) - t + 0.13 + 0 + 0.42
= 0.65.

Observe that the latter probability exceeds the unconditional probability of (DEER, LAYERS) computed in (5). The difference is due to the
impact of the premise (RABBITS, LAYERS), which changes our subject's
interpretation of LAYERS, bringing it into greater conformity with the
vector underlying DEER.
Intuitively, a statement (O, P) that gives rise to large gaps Pi - O; is
implausible, since O fails to meet conditions embodied in P. By the
same token, such a statement constitutes a surprising premise, and
thus tends to raise the probability of associated conclusions. 1 The dual
role of gaps is represented by (4) for statements and by gap-reduction
as discussed above for premises. The impact of premise gap is
modulated in our theory by multiplication with the similarity obtained
between premise and conclusion categories. Greater similarity is thus
assumed to increase the relevance to the conclusion of the information
contained in the premise. 2

2.4. Conditional Probability: Multiple Premises
The Gap Model's analysis of multiple-premise arguments is motivated
by the following principle.
PRINCIPLE OF PREMISE DIVERSITY. Adding a new premise
(0 re+t, P) to an argument
(O a, p)

( 0 m, P)
(0, P)

(9)

EXTRAPOLATING HUMAN PROBABILITY JUDGMENT

raises the probability of (O, P) only to the extent that
frorn 0 1- , • 0 m.

0 m+l
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Documentation of (9) in human reasoning may be found in [23]. 3 The
Gap Model takes account of premise diversity by a maximum-principle
for calculating the impact of multiple premises on the predicate
vector.
We may illustrate with argument (3), abbreviated to:
(LIONS, LAYERS)

(10)

(RABBITS, LAYERS)

(DEER,LAYERS)
The potential impact of the premise (RABBITS,LAYERS) on the sizevalue of LAYERSis defined by (7), yielding 3 × 0.290 = 0.870. Likewise,
the potential impact of (LIONS, LAYERS) on the size-value of LAYERSis
(LAYERS 1 ~ LIONS1) ×

similarity( LIONS, DEER).

This number is:
(4 -' 3) x

] -t- 5~//02 "t- 5 2 + 7 2

-

0.104.

Since the potential impact on size of (RABBITS,LAYERS)exceeds that
of (LIONS, LAYERS), the size-value of LAYERS is decreased by the
former rather than by the latter. Hence LAYERS1 declines by 0.870 to
3.13.
On the psychological level, the (assumed) fact that rabbits have
three layers of lipid tissue surrounding vital organs provides more
information about the minimal size required for deer to possess this
property than does the corresponding fact about lions. Indeed,
according to Table II (LIONS, LAYERS)provides little information since
lions are already assumed to have nearly the required size; additionally, lions have low resemblance to deer. On the other hand,
(RABBITS,LAYERS)is quite informative since rabbits have much less of
the size previously thought to be necessary; additionally they resemble
deer more than lions do (once again, according to the table).
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The third attribute provides a contrasting case. The potential impact
of (LIONS, LAYERS)on frigid-habitat equals
(LAYERS 3 --" LIONS3) X

similarity(LIONS, DEER)

= 8 × 0.t04 = 0.832.
This exceeds the potential impact of (RABBITS,LAYERS) o n frigid-habitat,
which is:
(LAYERS 3 ~" RABBITS3) X similarity(RABBITS, DEER) =- 2

× 0.290 = 0.580.
Hence, it is the gap provoked by (LIONS, LAYERS) and attenuated by

similarity(HoNs, DEER) that decreases LAYERS3.
The foregoing process yields a modified predicate-vector LAYERS'.
The probability associated with argument (10) is then computed as
before from formula (4). On the basis of Table II this number is 0.77,
which is higher than for the 1-premise argument (6).
Our use of maximization ensures that an argument (s ! s~, s2) whose
premises bear on highly similar objects will be assigned roughly the
same probability as (s I sl). In contrast, if s 1, s 2 involve dissimilar
objects, then the potential impact induced by a given attribute has an
additional chance to exceed its potential impact in (s[ sl). Diversity of
premises thus tends to increase the probability of (s I s 1, s2) compared
to (sis1). In this sense maximization implements principle (9).

2.5. Summary of the Model
Operative formulas. Let A, B, and P be real vectors of length n
(conceived as two object vectors and a predicate vector, respectively).
1

prob(A, P) - 1 + Ein_l (Pi "~Ai)

(11)

1
similarity(A, B) - 1 + distance(A, B)

(12)

(where distance is Euclidean distance).
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For the next formula we conceive of (A, P) as a premise and (B, P)
as the conclusion of a given argument. Let i ~<n be given.

potential impact(A, B, P, i) = (Pi "- Ai) x similarity(A, B)

(13)
Evaluation of arguments. Let argument

(0 1 p)
(Om, p )

(o, P)
be given, and suppose that its objects and predicate are represented by
real vectors of length n. The (conditional) probability associated with
this argument is calculated as follows.
If m = 0 then the probability is prob(O, P).
If m i> 1 then the probability is prob(O, P'), where P' is the length n
vector whose ith coordinate is calculated as follows:

PI = Pi - potential impact(A, O, P, i), where
A~{01...O

m} and

potential impact(A, O, P, i) >~potential impact(B, O, P, i)
for all B E {O 1--- Ore}.

(14)

2.6. Alternative Realizations of the Gap Model
The Gap Model rests on five psychological hypotheses, which may be
formulated as follows.

(0

The mental representation of objects and predicates can in large
part be summarized by real vectors in an appropriate attribute
space.
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(b) A statement (O, P) is perceived to be probable to the extent that
attributes evoked by the predicate are present in the object.
(c) An argument's premises increase the probability of its conclusion
by lowering the attribute values presumed necessary for possession
of the property in question.
(d) The impact of a premise depends on (i) the disparity between its
attribute-levels and those of the predicate, and (ii) the similarity of
the premise-object to the conclusion-object.
(e) The impact of multiple premises is governed by the maximum
principle of Section 2.4 (which entails, in practice, the diversity
principle (9)).
The formulas of our model realize hypotheses (a)-(e) in an extremely
simple way, and alternatives naturally come to mind. For example, the
arbitrary constant '1' in both (11) and (12) could be replaced by larger
constants in order to decelerate the descent of these functions towards
zero. Or, (11) might be replaced by
1

prob(A, P) = 1 + ~ E~=I (P,. "- A~)

(15)

where n is the dimension of the underlying attribute space. The
advantage of (15) is that adding dimensions to a space would not have
a tendency to lower the probabilities of statements since probability
according to (15) depends on average gaps rather than on their sum. A
similar modification could be made to (12).
As another example, the similarity function chosen for (12) is based
on the Euclidean metric, but it is well known that human similarity
judgment violates the metric axioms (see [36,37]). The Contrast
Model of similarity ([36, 21]) is known to have greater psychological
fidelity in this regard, and has figured in other studies of probability
judgment (e.g. [24, 35]). It might thus be usefully substituted for the
function defined in (12).
As a third example, our maximum principle implies that the
probability of a conclusion monotonically increases with additions to
the premise-set. However, counterexamples to monotonicity in human
judgment have been demonstrated in [23, 30]. Principles of 'coverage'
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discussed in [23] could be adjoined to the maximum principle in order
to account for such counterexamples.
Finally, a more sophisticated elaboration of the model would
supplement its vectorial representation of knowledge with the framebased architecture discussed in [1, 18, 19]. Evidence for the psychological reality of frames is considered in [28, 34].
We have investigated a variety of proposals like these, applying
elaborated versions of the Gap Model to the data described below. It
will be more revealing here, however, to retain the simple version of
the model, as summarized in Section 2.5. The positive results obtained
for extrapolation will then be more easily interpreted as favorable to
the general approach we advocate.
In more general terms, it is not the purpose of the present paper to
insist on the particular choices embodied by the Gap Model. It is
enough at present to show that solution to the extrapolation problem
can at least be envisioned, and to document some predictive success
for a simple model.

2. 7. Normative Status of the Gap Model
Numerical analysis of the Gap Model suggests that it assigns probabilities to arguments in a manner consistent with the standard
probability axioms. This feature of the model, however, is an artifact
of the restricted form of arguments to which it currently applies. When
the model is extended to a broader class of arguments, it becomes
normatively deviant. Minor modifications of the current version also
bring it into conflict with the probability axioms. This results, for
example, if probability function (11) is replaced by (15) (we omit the
details).
Fidelity to the probability calculus is a mixed blessing for models of
the kind at issue in this paper. It is an advantage for applications to
objective probabilities (generated, for example, by a database). In
contrast, it can be an impediment to modeling human judgment, which
in many contexts does not strictly adhere to the probability axioms
([12, 38, 30]). Indeed, it will be seen that subjects in our extrapolation
experiments sometimes violated a simple law of probability.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that no normative theory currently
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exists relating similarities among categories to the probabilities of
statements. People nonetheless exploit similarity for just this purpose
on a daily basis (see [31] for discussion). It may be hoped that
reflection on the extrapolation problem will generate insight into the
normative role of similarity in probability assessment.
3. E X T R A P O L A T I O N

EXPERIMENT

Our experiment was performed on 52 undergraduates from the
University of Michigan, recruited by advertisement and paid for their
participation.

3.1. Method
The experimental protocol may be divided into three parts. First,
subjects were presented with a set of objects and predicates. Second,
they assigned probabilities to every argument of form (2) induced by
the set. Third, as a reliability check, they made the same judgments a
second time - on the same arguments but in a different random order.
We consider these parts in turn.

Presentation of objects and predicates. Subjects were randomly assigned one of the two sets of stimuli in Table III. A stimulus set
TABLE III

Objecu:
Predicate 1:
Predicate 2:

Objects:
Predicate 1:
Predicate 2:

Sets of objects and predicates available as options.
Set 1
Bears, Beavers, Squirrels, Monkeys, Gorillas
have 3 distinct layers of fat tissue
surrounding vital organs
have over 80% of their brain surface
devoted to neocortex
Set 2
Lions, Housecats, Camels, Elephants, Hippos
have a visual system that fully adapts
to darkness in less than 5 minutes
have skins more resistant to
penetration than most synthetic fibers
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consisted of five mammal species to serve as objects plus two predicates. It was verified for each subject that the mammals of the chosen
option were familiar and easily distinguishable, and that the chosen
predicates were interpretable and meaningful. The sets were constructed so as to manifest a range of similarity among the five
mammals (at least, in the judgment of the experimenters).
The five objects and either one of the two predicates assigned to the
subject generate 80 arguments, as described in Table I. Since only one
predicate may appear in a given argument, these two sets of 80
arguments exhaust the possibilities.

Assignment of probabilities. Each subject assigned probabilities to his
160 arguments, delivered in random order via computer. For multipremise arguments, the order of premises was determined randomly.
To illustrate, a typical 2-premise argument was presented as follows.

What is the probability that
Bears have over 80% of brain surface
devoted to neocortex
given that this is true of:
squirrels and beavers.
Probability:
The 'given that' clause did not appear for 0-premise arguments. In
prior instructions it was emphasized that probabilities must be assigned
while assuming the truth of given premises (if any). On the other
hand, each question was to be treated separately, with no assumptions
carried forward.
The first two parts of the procedure were performed in immediate
succession, and required roughly one hour to complete.

Reliability check. One to three days later subjects returned to evaluate
their 160 arguments for a second time. The arguments were delivered
in a new random order; premise-order within multi-premise arguments
was also freshly randomized. The subject's previous responses were
not made available to him.
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3.2. Preliminary Analyses
For each subject the Pearson correlation was computed between his
responses to corresponding arguments in parts 2 and 3 of the procedure. This correlation was less than 0.7 for 22 of the subjects, who
were dropped from all further analyses. The median reliability for the
remaining 30 subjects is 0.80. In all ensuing analysis we use the
average of a subject's two responses to the same argument as the
'official' probability he assigns to that argument.
The following analysis indicates the degree to which the judgments
of our 30 subjects deviate from the probability calculus. It is well
known that for any two statements p, q the axioms of probability
require:
Pr(p ^ q) >/Pr(p) + Pr(q) - 1

(16)

Since Pr(p] q) = Pr(p A q)/Pr(q), (16) implies:

Pr(p[ q) × Pr(q)/> Pr(p)

+ Pr(q) - 1

(17)

Each subject evaluated forty 1-premise arguments of form (Plq)
along with the corresponding statements p, q. Hence, each subject had
forty occasions to violate inequality (17). In fact, 22 of the 30 subjects
violated (17) at least once. The average number of violations over all
30 subjects is 6.7.

3.3. Extrapolation Based on the Gap Model
Extrapolation analyses using the Gap Model were performed on a
within-subject basis via the following five steps.

Step 1. The 160 arguments evaluated by a given subject were
segregated into two sets of 80 according to the predicate appearing
therein. Each set of 80 arguments was treated separately, thereby
dividing each of the thirty subjects into two halves. In the sequel we
shall refer to these 60 data-sets (two per subject) as 'half-subjects'.
Step 2. The 80 arguments of a given, half-subject were partitioned
into two sets. One set was used to fix the parameters of the Gap Model
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TABLE IV
Extrapolation using correlation as a measure of fit. Columns 2 and 3 describe the
arguments used to fix the parameters of the model, and those predicted subsequently.
Columns 4-6 present the median correlations obtained in the testing phase for the
original Gap Model, the model with similarity set uniformlyto 1.0, and the model with
the maximum-principle replaced by addition. The medians are computed over sixty,
half-subjects.
Arguments
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Median Correlation

used for fixing

used for testing

Gap

NoSim

NoMax

60 non-3-premise
60 random
50 non-2-premise
50 random
30 2-premise
30 random
20 3-premise
20 random

20 3-premise
remaining 20
30 2-premise
remaining 30
50 non-2-premise
remaining 50
60 non-3-premise
remaining 60

0.88
0.85
0.88
0.84
0.79
0.77
0.73
0.72

0.74
0.76
0.75
0.77
0.70
0.70
0.49
0.60

0.82
0.86
0.85
0.85
0.79
0.80
0.65
0.76

(as described below); the other set tested the predictions of the model
once its parameters were fixed. Eight kinds of partitions were employed, listed in Table IV. For example, row (1) of Table IV refers to
the partition in which the 60 arguments were chosen randomly for
parameter-fixing, and the remaining 20 were used for testing. Such
r a n d o m partitions were generated afresh for each of the 60 halfsubjects.
Step 3. A dimensionality n for the underlying attribute space was
chosen. In the example of Section 2, n = 3. For the present analyses
we used both n = 2 and n = 3. Small values of n are suggested by
multidimensional scaling solutions to judgments of similarity among
members of natural categories like mammals or birds. Typically, two
or three dimensions suffice to approximately represent such judgements in euclidean space (see [27, 2]). For brevity, we discuss only the
choice n = 2; the results for n = 3 are entirely comparable. Thus, in
what follows we assume that the five objects and one predicate
appearing in the 80 arguments of a half-subject are each associated
with real values on two attributes. Twelve (= 2(5 + 1)) parameters
must therefore be fixed in order for the Gap Model to make
predictions about new arguments. No attempt was made to identify the
two attributes (size, ferocity, etc.) presumed to underlie subjects'
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representations of objects and predicates. These attributes are simply
formal place-holders in what follows.
Step 4. For each half-subject, an iterative procedure was employed
to find values of the 12 free parameters that maximize the Gap Model's
fit to the initial, fixing set of arguments (the testing arguments play no
role in this step). To illustrate, consider the partition described by the
first row of Table IV. Choice of the 12 parameters causes the Gap
Model to assign probabilities to each of the sixty arguments with
0, 1, 2, or 4 premises. These sixty probabilities may be compared to
those selected by a given subject. As a measure of goodness-of-fit, we
calculated the Pearson correlation between the corresponding probabilities assigned by model and subject to each of these 60 arguments.
(A different measure of fit is discussed below.) The set of 12
parameters that maximize this correlation was retained. Independent
maximization was carried out for each of the sixty, half-subjects with
respect to each of the eight partitions in Table IV (480 maximizations
in all). The maximization algorithm employed was based on the
'direction set' method described in [26, Chapter 10]. Twenty starting
points were tried, chosen uniformly-randomly within [ - 2 , 2 ] 12. The
best set of parameters over all twenty runs was retained.
Step 5. Once the best set of 12 parameters - associated with a given,
half-subject and a given partition of arguments- was obtained, the
Gap Model with those parameters was applied to the 'testing' arguments of the partition in question. The probabilities generated by the
model in this way were then compared to the corresponding probabilities assigned by the subject. The Pearson correlation between
these sets of probabilities was used as a measure of fit.
For each of the eight partitions, the column headed 'Gap' in Table
IV shows the median correlation obtained in step 5 over all 60
half-subjects.4 Note that even when the information fed into our
extrapolation algorithm is limited to 20, randomly chosen arguments, it
predicts the remaining 60 arguments up to a correlation of 0.72. Figure
1 shows the scatter plot for the half-subject whose correlation is at the
median value 0.88 with respect to the partition described in the first
row of Table IV.5 Likewise, Figure 2 shows the scatter plot for the
half-subject at the median value with respect to partition 2.
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3.4. Extrapolation Based on Variants' of the Gap Model
As a further test of the psychological reality of the Gap Model, we
considered two variant models differing from the original in selected
ways. The first variant removed considerations of similarity from the
Gap Model by uniformly imposing the value 1.0 as the outcome of all
similarity calculations; in other respects the first variant is the same as
the original. Thus, the new model-called NoSim-results from
replacing formula (12) by:

similarity(A, B) = 1.0

for all objects A, B .

The second, variant model results from replacing the maximum
principle (14) by a principle of addition, formulated as follows. Let an
m-premise argument
(O 1, p )

( O ' , P)
(O, P)
with m t> 1 be given. The probability assigned to this argument is

prob(O, P') where:
P~ = Pi - ~ potential impact(O i, O, P, i)
1=1

(The function potential impact is defined in formula (13).) Thus,
the present variant-called NoMax-lowers the values of P
by the total impact of the premiscs, rather than by their maximum.
The same extrapolation analyses performed on the Gap Model were
repeated on these two variants. The results are summarized in columns
5 and 6 of Table IV. The Gap Model performs better than NoSim, thus
giving indirect support to the role of similarity in probability judgment.
The comparison with NoMax, however, offers little evidence for the
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TABLE V
Direct comparison of the Gap Model and its two variants, using correlation as a measure
of fit. Columns 2 and 3 summarize the partitions used. Column 4 shows the number of
half-subjects (out of 60) whose correlation in step 5 favors the Gap Model over NoSim.
Column 5 provides the same information with respect to NoMax.

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Arguments
used for fixing
used for testing

Comparison of models
Gap vs. NoSim
Gap vs. NoMax

60 non-3-premise
60 random
50 non-2-premise
50 random
30 2-premise
30 random
20 3-premise
20 random

50
37
49
41
46
46
51
41

20 3-premise
remaining 20
30 2-premise
remaining 30
50 non-2-premise
remaining 50
60 non-3-premise
remaining 60

41
38
37
32
33
30
39
28

m a x i m u m principle. G r e a t e r support emerges from the finer analysis
s u m m a r i z e d in Table V. Column 4 of the table shows the n u m b e r of
half-subjects (out of 60) for w h o m the G a p Model provides a higher
correlation in step 5 than does NoSim. Column 5 provides the same
c o m p a r i s o n with respect to NoMax.
3.5. Absolute Deviation as a Measure o f Fit

Instead of maximizing correlation coefficients, as above, another
natural m e a s u r e of fit between model and data is the average, absolute
deviation between predicted and observed probabilities. To illustrate,
consider again the first partition of Table IV. Fixing the G a p Model's
12 free p a r a m e t e r s causes it to assign probabilities p~ to each of the
sixty arguments with 0, 1, 2, or 4 premises. A given subject assigns
probabilities qi to the same arguments. As a measure of fit, we now
use the average over I p i - qit, instead of correlation. The same
m e a s u r e of fit is used in step 5, to test the model. O f course, we now
seek to minimize the average absolute deviation, c o m p a r e d to maximizing the correlation. Otherwise the details of the optimization
p r o c e d u r e are the same.
All of the preceding analyses were repeated using absolute deviation
in place of correlation. T h e results are summarized in Tables V I and
V I I . T o illustrate, the n u m b e r '0.075' in row 1, column 4 of Table VI

124

DANIEL OSHERSON ET AL.
TABLE VI

Extrapolation using absolute deviation as a measure of fit. Columns 2 and 3 describe the
arguments used to fix the parameters of the model, and those predicted subsequently.
Columns 4-6 present the median, average, absolute deviation obtained in the testing
phase for the original Gap Model, the model with similarity set uniformly to 1.0, and the
model with the maximum-principle replaced by addition. The medians are computed
over sixty, half-subjects.
Arguments
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Median Deviation

used for fixing

used for testing

Gap

NoSim

NoMax

60 non-3-premise
60 random
50 non-2-premise
50 random
30 2-premise
30 random
20 3-premise
20 random

20 3-premise
remaining 20
30 2-premise
remaining 30
50 non-2-premise
remaining 50
60 non-3-premise
remaining 60

0.075
0,080
0.074
0.084
0,096
0,102
0,132
0.118

0.169
0.174
0.174
0,173
0,190
0.188
0.267
0.203

0.087
0.094
0,085
0,098
0,109
0.118
0.144
0.130

TABLE VII
Direct comparison of the Gap Model and its two variants, using absolute deviation as a
measure of fit. Columns 2 and 3 summarize the partitions used. Column 4 shows the
number of half-subjects (out of 60) whose average, absolute deviation in step 5 favors
the Gap Model over NoSim. Column 5 provides the same information with respect to

NoMax.
Arguments
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Comparison of models
Gap vs, NoMax

used for fixing

used for testing

Gap vs. NoSim

60 non-3-premise
60 random
50 non-2-premise
50 random
30 2-premise
30 random
20 3-premise
20 random

20 3-premise
remaining 20
30 2-premise
remaining 30
50 non-2-premise
remaining 50
60 non-3-premise
remaining 60

60
54
57
55
60
59
59
52

34
31
35
32
39
38
39
37

i n d i c a t e s the a b s o l u t e size of the e r r o r c o m m i t t e d b y the G a p M o d e l
w h e n it is used to e x t r a p o l a t e 3-premise a r g u m e n t s f r o m the rest. I n
t e r m s of a b s o l u t e d e v i a t i o n , the G a p M o d e l is seen to o u t p e r f o r m b o t h
t h e N o S i m a n d N o M a x variants.
W e n o t e t h a t m a x i m i z i n g the c o r r e l a t i o n in Step 4 of o u r e x t r a p o l a t i o n analysis t e n d s n o t to m i n i m i z e the m e d i a n , a b s o l u t e d e v i a t i o n in
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Step 5; nor does minimizing the latter maximize the former. It thus
appears necessary to choose in advance the desired kind of extrapolation.
4. C O N C L U D I N G

REMARKS

Despite its simplicity, the Gap Model enjoys nonnegligible success in
extrapolation. We interpret this result as encouraging the view that
successors to the Gap Model could eventually provide reasonably
accurate models of probability judgment in natural domains of reasoning.
The practical interest of such models is highlighted by recent
progress in the theory of influence diagrams [8] and belief nets [25, 14]
(see [20, 29] for an introduction). This work provides a set of tools for
constructing efficient systems of decision-making and analysis that are
grounded in the theory of utility and probability. Use of the tools,
however, often requires large numbers of conditional probabilities to
be elicited from an external, human agent (for example, many
thousands in the systems built by Heckerman [4]). A successful
method of extrapolation might allow fewer judgments to be elicited;
the remaining judgments would be estimated. Likewise, a small set of
missing probabilities - unforeseen at the outset of a project - could be
extrapolated at a later stage from stored probabilities.
Extrapolation might also be used to enlarge the set of conditional
probabilities that can be estimated from a database. To explain,
suppose that data are available about the occurrence and co-occurrence of binary categories A 1 . - - A n. The data might be numerous
enough to empirically estimate conditional probabilities of form
Pr(Ai I Aj) but not of forms Pr(Ai I Aj, A~), Pr(A~ I Aj, A~, Al), etc.
This situation will occur whenever the number of categories A i is too
large for the number of records in the database, since complex
conditioning events will occur too infrequently to allow meaningful
estimates of the probability of their subevents.
Extrapolation might nonetheless provide a subjectively plausible
guess about the missing probabilities. This would be achieved by the
use of a 'dummy' predicate P asserting that a record drawn randomly
from the database falls into whatever category is associated with it.
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Thus (A, P) is the statement that a given record falls into category A,
and the probability attached to this statement can be estimated directly
from the database. Similarly, the argument
(A1, P)
(A2, P)
represents the proportion of records in category A 2 among those in
category A 1. These numbers in hand, an extrapolation algorithm
provides conjectures about the conditional probabilities embodied in
arguments of arbitrary complexity. Application of the Gap Model, for
example, would proceed by seeking featural representations for the
categories at issue, as well as for the dummy P. The features sought for
P would be those representing a typical or modal record in the
database, giving rise thereby to appropriate gaps with respect to the
categories A 1- • • A,. Whatever the extrapolation algorithm employed,
if it is based on an adequate psychological theory, its conjectures will
enjoy the plausibility of human judgment. The objective accuracy of
these judgments can then be compared to those delivered by more
familiar principles of 'ampliative inference' such as maximizing entropy
(see [10, 11, 13,221) 2
More fundamentally, the kind of model envisioned in this paper
would be able to convert information about object- and predicateattributes into conditional probabilities of arguments. Suppose, for
example, that a database contained 100 objects and 100 predicates,
each coded along five attributes; it would thus contain 5 x (100 + 100)
or 1000 values. In contrast, 100 objects and 100 predicates generate an
astronomical number of arguments, any of whose probabilities might
be needed in an associated system of automated reasoning. Construction of the reasoning system would be facilitated by an algorithm that
could examine the available database and supply reasonable approximations to the probabilities a human agent would attribute to the
arguments in question. Such an algorithm would be particularly useful
in any attempt to automate the synthesis of reasoning systems whose
performance need not exceed the standard of common sense.
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NOTES
1 For discussion of surprise in evaluating the probability of arguments, see [9, Chapter

41.
2 The role of similarity in induction is reviewed in [31]. Evidence that similarity is
evaluated along multiple dimensions within reasoning tasks is presented in [51.
3 The plausibility of (9) from a normative, epistemological point of view is discussed in
[6,71.
4 As expected, the correlations obtained in the retrodictive step 4 are systematically
higher than those obtained in prediction.
5 Because there are an even number of half-subjects, the median value is actually
straddled by two subjects. We show the plot for the lower subject.
6 Note that entropy principles cannot be applied to our psychological data because the
latter are not consistent with the probability calculus (see Section 3.2).
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